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IN SEARCH OF A DILUTION SOLUTION: IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
W Whitaker Rayner*
I. INTRODUCTION

Common law and federal and state statutory law long have recognized trademark infringement as a remedy available to trademark owners. Under such provisions, courts provide injunctive and/or monetary relief if a likelihood of consumer confusion exists between the senior user's mark and the junior user's
mark.' As trademark law developed in the first half of the twentieth century, it
became clear that an additional remedy was necessary to prevent the weakening
of trademarks from use of similar marks by others, even if the public was not
likely to be confused between the marks at issue. Accordingly, the concept of
dilution evolved as an attempt to protect the tarnishment or blurring of the distinctive qualities of trademarks.2
The concept of dilution as a statutory remedy had its beginnings with state law.
Beginning with enactment of a state statutory dilution provision in
Massachusetts in 1947,1 states began to address through legislation the problem
of dilution through tarnishment or blurring. In 1996, after approximately onehalf of the states had enacted dilution statutes, Congress passed and President
Clinton signed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA").'
In the ensuing years, federal courts have struggled with the development of a
body of case law interpreting the FTDA. As more fully described below, the var* W. Whitaker Rayner is a shareholder in the Jackson, Mississippi, law firm of Watkins Ludlam Winter &
Stennis, P.A. He is a former chair of the Model State Trademark Bill sub-committee of the Intellectual Property
Committee of the American Bar Association and is a member of the United States Legislation Analysis
Committee of the International Trademark Association.
I. The Lanham Trademark Act protects registered marks from infringement and provides that:
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by
the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Act protects unregistered marks from infringement and provides that
[alny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id. at 1125(a)(1).
2. The origins of dilution law in the United States are generally traced to Frank 1. Schechter and his article,
The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1927).
3. 1947 Mass. Acts 300.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp.
1999)).
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ious circuits have, on occasion, reached diametrically opposed conclusions as to
the interpretation of certain provisions of the FTDA.
At times, courts have decided claims for dilution under the FTDA by resorting
to longstanding concepts and tests more commonly associated with a likelihood
of confusion analysis under trademark infringement law. To correctly interpret
the intent behind the FTDA, courts must shy away from these traditional
infringement analyses and resort instead to new analyses that recognize the
sharply different concept of distinctiveness undergirding the body of dilution law.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DILUTION LAW

Since the time of the caveman, society has used various markings to define
ownership of goods.' With the advance of society and the division of labor,
markings have been used not only to provide a claim of ownership, but also to
provide identification of the source of manufacture or creation of goods sold in
the marketplace.6
Trademark law through the first half of the twentieth century was concerned
almost exclusively with efforts to prevent consumer confusion caused by the use
of similar marks on similar or related products.! Where products were dissimilar
or unrelated, courts and juries were reluctant to find that consumers were likely
to be confused as to the origin of the products at issue.' Nonetheless, trademark
owners, through the manufacture of quality products and extensive marketing,
developed a substantial amount of goodwill in the marks they used. Certain of
these marks became "famous marks," each having earned widespread recognition.
On more than one occasion, owners of these marks brought infringement
actions against owners of the same or similar marks with respect to non-competitive goods, only to be defeated at trial when a court or jury ruled that there was
no likelihood that the public would confuse a trademark and product with the
mark and product of a junior user in an unrelated market for goods or services.'
5. Indeed, the term "brand,' frequently associated with trademark law, had its origins in the branding of
animals used to identify ownership. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 5:01 (3d ed. 1992).
6. Artisans in the middle ages used certain symbols or "marks" to identify the source of creation of the
item sold or traded. Thus, from the beginning, trademarks have served as an important economic tool, allowing
customers to easily recognize levels of quality and workmanship without having to fully investigate each purchase and trace the product back to its point of origin. See id.
7. See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 24:2 (discussing the development of trademark law as to non-competitive products).
8. Demonstrating courts' reluctance to find infringement in the case of dissimilar goods, in Arrow
Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that use of the mark "ARROW" for distilled spirits did not infringe upon a prior use of the
mark for beer. Because of widespread use of the mark on different products, the court reasoned that infringement relating to these products was not likely because the products were different (brewed vs. distilled) and
were prohibited by federal law from being manufactured at the same facility. Id. at 351.
9. See id.; see also Zazu Designs v. UOreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that Zazu for hair
care product does not infringe upon Zazu for a hair salon); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912) (holding no infringement between non-competing uses of "Borden" on ice
cream and condensed milk).
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Reacting to concern over the inequities of having hard-earned goodwill whittled
away by use of similar marks, courts and state legislatures developed a body of
law concerned not with consumer confusion, but with the distinctive characteristics of the actual marks and the goodwill associated with those marks.
After courts and legislatures established dilution on the state level, many trademark owners began to seek a more uniform and nationwide remedy through federal legislation. Congress defeated an earlier attempt in 1988 to enact a dilution
law at the federal level."0 However, in 1996, Congress passed and the President
signed into law the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, the first federal pronouncement on the still-developing concept of dilution. 1"
IlI. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
The FTDA provides in part that:
(I) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a
court may consider factors such as, but not limited to (A) the degree of inherent
or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C)
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels
of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the
marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the
nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H)
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 2
Furthermore, the FTDA defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark
and the other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception."'13
Unlike many state statutes, the FTDA provides a dilution remedy only to the
owners of "famous marks.""' Through enactment of the FTDA, Congress has
10. Early drafts of the 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act contained a federal dilution provision. The dilution provisions passed the Senate, but were removed by the House prior to passage. See Jerome Gilson, A
FederalDilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 109 (1993).
Ii. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp.
1999)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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created a new federal remedy based not directly upon concern over the consuming public's ability to avoid confusion in the marketplace, but upon the somewhat
unrelated concept of the ownership of certain rights by the trademark owner to
the goodwill associated with the mark."5 While it may be true that the more
famous a mark becomes and the more goodwill which attaches to a mark, the
more likely the public may be confused by seemingly unrelated products bearing
the same or similar name, the concept of dilution has as its basis the different
standards of distinctiveness and fame. This difference in focus has caused problems for the courts in applying the FTDA to certain factual situations.
IV EARLY

CIRCUIT DECISIONS

The Lanham Act was the embodiment of federal trademark infringement law
before the FTDA. In the 1946 legislative history of that Act, the Senate
Committee on Patents stated in part that "ideas concerning trademark protection
have changed in the last 40 years and the statutes have not kept pace with the
commercial development."'" Fifty years later, Congress once again found itself
revising trademark law in an effort to keep pace with changing commercial realities. Courts have not been easily persuaded that the FTDA provides a new
framework for additional trademark remedies, wholly separate from those of
trademark infringement. Consequently, a number of circuits have reached widely
differing results in interpreting issues arising under the FTDA.
Courts have considered the following issues examined in this Article:
1. Whether a showing of a likelihood of dilution is sufficient to invoke the
court's injunctive powers, or whether a plaintiff must prove actual dilution;
2. Whether the concepts of fame and distinctiveness are identical for the purposes of the FTDA;
3. Whether the FTDA is applicable to claims arising out of competing goods;
4. Whether a "likelihood of confusion" is relevant to a dilution analysis.
A. Must a ClaimantShow Actual Dilution Under the FTDA?
One of the first major issues over which the divided circuits struggled was
whether plaintiffs in dilution proceedings must provide proof of actual dilution,
or whether evidence tending to establish a likelihood of dilution is sufficient.
The "likelihood of confusion" standard has long been the test for infringement
proceedings. 7 Under the "likelihood of confusion" test, actual confusion need
15. In his article, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basisfor Trademark Protection,
Robert N. Kliger describes the difference between infringement and dilution as a differentiation between consumer confusion and the "persuasive advertising" functions of trademarks. 58 U. PrrT. L. REv. 789, 860-61
(1997).
16. S. Res. 0133, 79th Cong. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1275-76.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (regulating infringement of registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(I) (regulating infringement of unregistered marks).
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not be proved and is but one of several factors the trier of fact must consider in
determining whether one person's mark infringes on that of another. 8
Borrowing from this language, numerous state statutes and the 1964 version of
the Model State Trademark Bill in particular have expressly adopted likelihood
of dilution as the standard for the granting of injunctive relief arising out of dilution claims." According to the text of the 1964 version of the Model State
Trademark Bill, "the likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief."2
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not expressly include this "likelihood of dilution" language, but instead provides that
[tihe owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.21

The first circuit court to expressly consider the issue of whether a showing of
likelihood of dilution is sufficient to state a cause of action under the FTDA
found that a plaintiff must show actual dilution prior to the awarding of relief. 22
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development, the famous circus sought to prohibit the Utah Division of
Travel Development from using the mark "The Greatest Snow on Earth," arguing
that such mark diluted Ringling's "The Greatest Show on Earth" mark which had
been in use since 1872.23
The trial court found for the State of Utah.24 Ringling appealed the decision
and argued that if the FTDA required proof of any form of economic harm, it
was only threatened harm, not actual consummated harm.25 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that a plain reading of
18. In the Fifth Circuit, the factors to consider in evaluating a likelihood of confusion situation are:
I) the strength of the trademark at issue;
2) the degree of similarity between the two marks;
3) the similarity of products;
4) the identity of retail outlets and purchasers;
5) the identity of advertising media utilized;
6) the defendant's intent;
7) actual confusion.
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1992); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji
Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1985).
19. The Model State Trademark Bill ("MTSB") originated in 1949 with the United States Trademark
Association (now International Trademark Association). This Model Bill serves as a guideline for states in
enacting state trademark legislation. The 1992 version of the MSTB amended the "likelihood of dilution" provision to track the FTDA's "causes dilution" language, which originated with the failed 1988 federal dilution
provisions. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 22:04.
21.

15 U.S.C. § i 25(c)(I) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).

22. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F3d 449 (4th
Cir. 1999).

23. Id.
24. Id. at 452.

25. Id. at 460.
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the statute required a finding of actual dilution rather than the finding of a likelihood of dilution.2" Recognizing that the plain language of the FTDA appeared to
ignore the longstanding "likelihood of dilution" provisions of state law, the court
held, "[I]n the face of the obvious centrality of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions
in the interpretation and application of state anti-dilution statutes for the 50 years
of their existence, the federal Act does not so provide." 7
Five months later, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and held that,
despite the plain language of the FTDA, Congress implicitly recognized a "likelihood of dilution" standard. In that case, Nabisco sought a declaratory judgment that its inclusion of a fish-shaped cheese cracker as a part of its "CatDog"
product did not infringe or dilute any trademark rights of Pepperidge Farm to its
Goldfish cheese-flavored cracker.29 Relying on the recent Ringling decision,
Nabisco argued that dilution under the FTDA required proof of an "actual, consummated harm."30 Finding that a requirement of actual dilution as opposed to a
likelihood of dilution would require "excessive literalism to defeat the intention
of the statute," the Second Circuit held that "it seems plausibly within Congress'
meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an injunction to
prevent the harm before it occurs."3 Because a requirement of proof of dilution
would require the harm--dilution-to occur prior to the case's becoming ripe,
and because absent a showing of willful intent, the only remedy available under
the FTDA is injunctive relief, the statutory framework as interpreted by Ringling
would create incompensible injury. 2 Finding a sufficient likelihood of success
as to Pepperidge Farm's dilution counterclaims, the Second 33Circuit upheld the
lower court's order requiring Nabisco to recall its fish cracker.
While not specifically addressing the issue of proof of dilution, two other circuits implicitly came to differing conclusions as to the requirement of proving
actual dilution under the FTDA. In Luigino ",Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected Stouffer Corporation's
argument that the use of "Michelina's Lean 'N Tasty" mark diluted Stouffer's
"Lean Cuisine" mark.' Rejecting Stouffer's argument that consumers associated
"Lean Cuisine" and "Lean 'N Tasty" with low-fat frozen entrees, the Eighth
Circuit held that Stouffer was required to introduce evidence that the "Lean 'N
Tasty" mark caused consumers to associate the "Lean Cuisine" mark with some26. /d.
at 460-61.
27. Id. at 461.
28. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
29. The "CatDog" product was based upon Nickelodeon Television's cartoon program featuring a two-headed creature that is half cat and half dog. Fish is the favorite food and symbol for the cat half, and the bone is
the preferred meal and emblem for the dog half. Nabisco's crackers contained one-half "CatDog" characters,
one-quarter bones, and one-quarter fish. Id. at 213.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id. at 224.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 229.
34. Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 1999).
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thing other than Stouffer's frozen entrees.3 5 Because Stouffer failed to meet this
burden, the Court found for Luigino 's.3 Thus, while not expressly requiring a
finding of actual dilution, the Eighth Circuit implicitly held that evidence of
actual association between the two marks was required.
Finally, in the case of Panavision International,L.P v. Toeppen, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found for Panavision on its claims
that the defendant's use of the domain name "Panavision.com" diluted the plaintiff's "Panavision" mark.3 In providing a theoretical analysis similar to those
usually utilized in a "likelihood of confusion" analysis under infringement law,
the Ninth Circuit found that potential customers of Panavision would be discouraged if they could not find Panavision's web page by merely typing
"Panavision.com" and that such action would dilute the value of Panavision's
trademark?3 Without expressly addressing the issue of whether a "likelihood of
dilution" was sufficient, the Ninth Circuit, nonetheless, held that this theoretical
harm was sufficient to establish a claim of dilution under the FTDA.Y
While there may be a split of authority among the circuits as to whether the
FTDA expressly or implicitly provides a remedy upon a showing of a "likelihood
of dilution," an analysis of the statute makes it clear that the likelihood of dilution standard was intended by Congress in the enactment of the FTDA. As recognized by the Second Circuit in Nabisco, monetary damages are not available
under the FTDA, except in cases involving willful intent. ' Accordingly, if a
plaintiff were required to wait until such time as its mark actually had been diluted, then the virtually exclusive remedy of injunctive relief would be meaningless,
as the harm would already have occurred.
Taking the Nabisco court's argument one step further, if Congress had intended
to require the occurrence of actual dilution prior to a cause of action arising, a
claim of dilution might never be possible. Once a famous mark has been diluted,
goodwill associated with the mark is weakened and, by definition, the mark loses
some of its distinctive quality. Therefore, it would become difficult, if not
impossible, for the owner to overcome the hurdle of demonstrating that its mark
was still famous as required under the Act. Thus, requiring a finding of actual
dilution would render the statutory framework of the FTDA an eviscerated, tautological jumble.
Further, the plain language of the FTDA supports a finding that Congress only
intended a showing of likelihood of dilution. The Lanham Act provides that the
term "dilution" means "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or service."" As the term "capacity" is synonymous
with "potential" or "ability," the statute is concerned not so much with an actual
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999).
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
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lessening of the mark itself, but with the theoretical lessening of the mark's
potential to identify and distinguish goods or services. Finally, it is clear from
the express language of the FTDA that dilution is an equitable provision:
[T]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of the
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark. 2
An equitable doctrine does not require adherence to strict formalities. Indeed,
the concept of dilution is much more qualitative than the doctrine of infringement, which lends itself to more quantitative analysis. Dilution refers to the
quality of the mark and the notion of distinctiveness, as opposed to the more
measurable and quantitative concept of confusion in the eyes of the consuming
public.
In the FTDA legislative history, Congress makes it clear that the threat of dilution is much more ephemeral than the threat of infringement:
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox
confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be
debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to
immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.'
Pursuant to the above discussion, the standard to be used by the courts in determining dilution under the FTDA necessarily involves a determination of the likelihood or potential of dilution rather than the seemingly tautological standard of
requiring a showing of actual dilution prior to the granting of any relief.
B. Are Fame and Distinctiveness SeparateElements?
As discussed above, the FTDA limits relief to those marks which are termed
"famous marks" and against those marks that cause dilution to the distinctive
quality of such marks." The FTDA provides an eight-part test to determine
whether a mark is "distinctive and famous."4 " Some circuits have struggled over
the interrelation between the concepts of distinctiveness and fame. In Nabisco,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit not only treated distinctiveness and fame as separate elements, but also found that the concept of
distinctiveness is reserved for only certain famous marks.' 6 According to the
court, "[tihe requirement of distinctiveness is furthermore an important limitation. A mark that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness, is lacking the
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
43. H.R. 104-374, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995) (citing Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F Supp.
1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).

44. 15 U.s.C. § 1125(c)(1).

45. Id.
46. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
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very attribute that the anti-dilution statute seeks to protect."" Thus, the Nabisco
court would deny protection for "non-distinctive marks," even if such marks were
famous. 8
In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit found the opposite-that famous marks were a smaller subset
of distinctive marks. 9 According to the court in Avery, distinctiveness arises in
one of two ways." First, marks may be inherently distinctive." Second, marks
may have acquired distinctiveness, which is attained "when the purchasing public
associates the [mark] with a single producer or source, rather than just the product itself."' 2 The Avery court held that distinctiveness is a quality all marks must
possess in order to be registered in the United States Patent & Trademark Office
Principal Register.5 3 Recognizing the difference between fame and distinctiveness, the court further stated that "famousness requires a showing greater than
mere distinctiveness."'"
The more correct interpretation of the FTDA with respect to the issue of fame
versus distinctiveness is that famous marks are a subset of inherently distinctive
marks and marks with acquired distinctiveness, and thus no separate analysis
need be made. All famous marks are distinctive, whether they became distinctive over time or whether such marks are inherently distinctive. Conversely, not
all distinctive marks are famous. The language of the FTDA itself makes it clear
that Congress intended that famous marks protected by the FTDA are only a subset of all distinctive marks. Indeed, the first element of the eight-part test set
forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) to determine whether a mark is distinctive and
famous provides that a trier of fact may consider "the degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the mark."55 Thus, the distinctiveness of the mark is
but one of eight factors the trier of fact should consider in determining the fame
of a mark.
In its legislative history discussing the first element of the test for fame,
Congress found that
[t]he first factor makes it clear that a mark may be deemed "famous" even if not
inherently distinctive, that is, even if the mark is not arbitrary, fanciful or coined
....Finally, although a mark need not be federally registered in order to be eli-

gible for dilution protection, the fact that the mark is registered with the U. S.
Patent & Trademark Office may be considered by a court in determining
whether a mark is distinctive. This factor recognizes that a mark may not be
federally registered unless it is found by the PTO to be distinctive.5 8
47. Id. at 216.
48. See id. n.2 ("We think the inclusion of (he requirement of distinctiveness was intended, for good reason,
to deny protection of the statute to non-distinctive marks.").
49. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
50. Id. at 879.
51. Id. at 877.
52. Id. at 876.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 877.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(I) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
Sess. 7. (1995).
56. H.R. 104-374, 104th Cong., Ist
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Congress, in contradistinction to the court in Nabisco, found that distinctiveness is a prerequisite to a finding of fame. Thus, while all federally registered
marks must be distinctive, Congress makes it clear that not all distinctive marks
are eligible for protection under the FTDA.
C. Is DilutionApplicable to Competing Goods Under the FTDA?
Parties have argued, and at least one court has found, that dilution is a remedy
reserved for non-competing products rather than products competing in the same
market. When the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found in
Luigino s, that "Michelina's Lean 'N Tasty" mark did not dilute Stouffer's "Lean
Cuisine" mark, the court stated, "[n]ormally, the doctrine [of dilution] applies in
cases where 'similar marks are used on dissimilar goods."'' 7 The Eighth Circuit
went on to hold that Stouffer was required to offer evidence that the defendant's
mark caused consumers to associate the "Lean Cuisine" mark with something
other than frozen entrees."
While it is true that origins of dilution law were based upon proving infringement in non-competing goods," the FTDA makes it clear that the statutory remedy of federal dilution is available whether or not the marks are used on competing goods. Specifically, the FTDA in defining dilution states that the term "dilution" means "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of comletition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties."' This same language
was cited by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Nabisco when that court held that federal dilution claims may arise from competing as well as non-competing goods."
D. Is "Likelihood of Confusion " Relevant to a DilutionAnalysis?
In arguing to the court that dilution law should not apply in the case of competing goods, Nabisco appears to have argued that dilution and infringement were
mutually exclusive concepts. In rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit in
Nabisco went a step further and held that in making a determination as to
whether dilution is present, a dilution analysis should specifically6 2include the
presence or absence of actual confusion or a likelihood of confusion.
In contrast to this finding, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Avery found that a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis should
not be considered in an FTDA claim.' Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit did recog57. Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
61. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 E3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 217. The Eighth Circuit held, however, that because the defendants' product was not yet introduced into the marketplace, the absence of actual confusion was of no significance.
63. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 1999).

1999] IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTIONACT

103

nize that some factors relevant in a likelihood of confusion analysis are necessarily likewise relevant in a dilution analysis. According to the Ninth Circuit,
"[T]he close parallels between the two analyses are therefore not surprising; nor
do they cause us concern." ' The Ninth Circuit's resolution of this issue is correct and underscores a major difficulty of courts in struggling with the development of a workable paradigm for dilution law. Dilution and infringement seek to
protect different aspects of trademarks. Thus, evidence of one does not lead to
the existence of the other.
V

TOWARD A USEFUL ANALYSIS OF DILUTION CLAIMS UNDER THE

FTDA

For almost a century, trademark infringement was the only federal remedy
available to trademark owners. Trademark infringement analysis differs in certain minor respects among the circuits but,6" by and large, courts have become
comfortable with the analysis of factors relevant in a likelihood of confusion
analysis.
This is not the case when courts are faced with dilution claims under the
FTDA. Because courts are familiar with a likelihood of confusion analysis,
when faced with the FTDA statutory framework, they quite naturally retreat to
those concepts familiar to courts and practitioners alike-namely the likelihood
of infringement analysis under infringement law. While it is true that many factors such as strength of the senior mark, exclusivity of use, and public familiarity
with the mark are important to both analyses, courts and practitioners should not
preoccupy themselves with the likelihood of confusion factors in determining the
existence of dilution.
Although infringement in large part is subject to quantitative measurement and
survey, dilution analyses are more qualitative in nature and require conceptual
comparison of the marks at issue. While infringement law uses consumer confusion as the springboard for analysis, dilution law relies more upon tarnishment,
blurring, or other debilitation of the marks themselves.' The concept of dilution
is difficult to articulate and, in that respect, is very much like Justice Stewart's
famous pornography analysis which, paraphrased, states, "I can't define pornography, but I know it when I see it."'
Because of the difficulty in defining dilution, Congress chose to concentrate
the analysis set forth in the FTDA around the determination of whether a mark is
famous. In determining fame, courts must look to the distinctiveness of the
mark, the duration and extent of use of the mark, the duration and extent of
64. Id. at 880-81.
65. Compare, e.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 486 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing Fifth
Circuit test for infringement) with Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) (discussing the often-cited Second Circuit test for infringement). See also McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:19 (discussing differing foundational factors).
66. H.R. 104-374, 104th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 (1995).
67. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further
to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hard-core
pornography] and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.").
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advertising and publicity, the geographical trading area, the channels of trade, the
degree of recognition of the mark, the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought, and
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties.68
While these factors relate to fame of the senior mark, they also relate in varying
degree to the question of dilution itself. Specifically, consideration of the defendant's channels of trade and recognition of the plaintiff's mark in those channels
brings one such dilution factor within the fame and distinctiveness analysis.
Similarly, use of the same or similar marks by third parties involves a determination not only of fame, but also whether the plaintiff's mark is diluted by the
defendant's conduct or the conduct of other third parties.
Just as it took many years for courts to develop analyses to determine the likelihood of confusion, it will also take years to develop widely recognized and supported analyses for determining dilution. In the interim, courts should not unduly concern themselves with rigid requirements of survey evidence, proof of actual dilution, or presence of actual competition. Instead, courts should center their
analyses around the fact that Congress enacted a statute to protect the distinctiveness of famous marks by prohibiting use of such marks by others.
Courts aware of the likelihood of confusion analysis are familiar with the relative spectrum of the "strength" of marks. This spectrum shifts from generic
marks to descriptive marks to suggestive marks to arbitrary and fanciful marks.69
Indeed, courts should consider a different spectrum for dilution analysis:
Fungible

Indistinguishable

Blurred

Distinctive

Famous

On the left side of the spectrum are "fungible" marks, which because of widespread use by differing parties on different goods, retain no distinctiveness or
notoriety. Next on the spectrum are marks that are not indistinguishable, but
which because of blurring or tarnishment by others' use, can no longer clearly
distinguish goods or services.
Next on the spectrum are distinctive marks, which are marks that may or may
not be famous, but which are subject to widespread association by the public as
to the product or service the mark identifies. Such marks can be inherently distinctive-such as in the case of an arbitrary or fanciful mark--or can acquire distinctiveness through widespread and uninterrupted use by the trademark owner.
Finally, to the extreme right side of the spectrum is the classification of famous
marks. These are the relatively few marks which are so well known and unique
in the country that the notoriety of the mark transcends both channels of trade
and geographic regions.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
69. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (recognizing the long-standing classification
of relative strength of trademarks).
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It is these famous marks that the FTDA seeks to protect. If use of the same or
similar mark by a third person would cause a famous mark to shift to the left on
the above spectrum, then dilution has occurred. Thus, courts should be concerned first with making sure that a dilution-plaintiff's mark is properly classified as "famous"; and, second, that the defendant's use of its mark is likely to
cause the plaintiff's mark to slide toward the distinctive, blurred, or fungible end
of the spectrum.
There is no bright line test for such an analysis. Indeed, depending on the facts
of the case, various factors may or may not be relevant. Nonetheless, courts
should not become preoccupied with traditional infringement analyses, nor
should they be concerned with overly-stringent requirements which would defeat
the purpose of protection of famous marks. Over time, the uncertainties evidenced by the current state of the law will mature into a workable balance which
protects the rights of owners of famous marks and the rights of other parties who
acquire trademarks."0
70. See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 24:114 ("The balance between fair competition and free competition
must always be maintained and kept fine-tuned for the economy to work at a reasonable rate of efficiency and
competitiveness.").

